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ARBITRATION 
Choosing Tennessee Law May Prohibit Arbitration of Fraud in the 
Inducement. Whisenant v. Bill Heard Chevrolet, Inc., No. W2004-01745-COA-R3-CV, 
2005 Tenn. App. LEXIS 418, 2005 WL 1629991 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 12, 2005). 
By Melissa Hunter 
 Parties who enter into an arbitration agreement are usually required to 
resolve disputes with arbitration.  However, when a party alleges that the transaction 
was fraudulently induced, the party may be entitled to a judicial resolution of the 
claim.  Recently, the Tennessee Court of Appeals denied a motion to compel 
arbitration when a party alleged fraud in the inducement in Whisenant v. Bill Heard 
Chevrolet, Inc.   
 In Whisenant, Whisenant and Bill Heard Chevrolet entered into a contract for 
the sale of a vehicle.  The contract contained an arbitration provision; the provision 
stated that all issues regarding the transaction, including issues involving the 
formation of the agreement, were to be submitted to an arbitrator.  The provision 
also stated that Tennessee law governed the transaction.  Soon after the transaction 
was completed, Whisenant’s vehicle began malfunctioning.  Whisenant filed suit 
against Bill Heard Chevrolet under several theories, including fraud in the 
inducement.  Bill Heard Chevrolet responded by filing a motion to require 
arbitration, which was denied by the trial court.   
 Bill Heard Chevrolet argued that since the Federal Arbitration Act grants a 
presumption of arbitrability when arbitration clauses are present, this dispute should 
be submitted to the arbitrator in accordance with the mutually agreed upon terms of 
the contract.  Bill Heard Chevrolet noted that the agreement explicitly states that 
fraudulent inducement is arbitrable since the agreement includes issues involving 
representations made in connection with the sale of the vehicle.   
 The Tennessee Court of Appeals acknowledged that fraud in the inducement 
is an issue involving contract formation, and this agreement implies that the parties 
have agreed to arbitrate such issues.  After examining Tennessee case law, the court 
rejected Bill Heard Chevrolet’s arguments and affirmed the trial court based on two 
considerations.   
First, the appellate court noted that the arbitration agreement did not 
explicitly state that fraud in the inducement was arbitrable.  Second, the parties 
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agreed that Tennessee law would govern the transaction.  Tennessee case law holds 
that, when parties to an arbitration agreement select Tennessee state law to govern 
disputes, issues of fraud in the inducement are not arbitrable.  Tennessee courts 
recognize that this approach is a “minority view,” but have asserted that it is the 
“better view.”   
 Transactional lawyers should advise clients who utilize arbitration clauses of 
the ramifications of selecting Tennessee law to govern transactions.  As Whisenant 
illustrates, parties to an arbitration agreement who select Tennessee law to govern 
will not be compelled to arbitrate allegations of fraudulent inducement, absent 
language in the agreement to the contrary.  In light of Whisenant, a lawyer may 
suggest that clients re-draft arbitration provisions.  Clients may choose to select 
another jurisdiction in which to resolve issues or may explicitly state in the 
agreement that parties agree to arbitrate all issues involving contract formation, 
including fraud in the inducement. 
 
BUSINESS ENTITIES 
Limited Partnerships Do Not Dissolve on Their Own.  Barton v. Gilleland, No. 
E2004-01369-COA-R3-CV, 2005 Tenn. App. LEXIS 187, 2005 WL 729174 (Tenn. 
Ct. App. Mar. 30, 2005). 
By Daniel French 
 The dissolution of a limited partnership is more complicated when the initial 
agreement or provisions within the agreement creating the partnership have been 
amended or supplemented by subsequent agreements.  The partners, whether limited 
or general, must carefully review subsequent agreements to assure that their desired 
intent is expressed in a plain and unambiguous way.  Further, partners must act in 
accordance with that expressed intent to prevent an ambiguous interpretation.  
Otherwise, partners will find themselves bogged down in difficulties like those 
considered by the Tennessee Court of Appeals in Barton v. Gilleland.  
 On September 18, 1978, the limited partnership of Henry Manor, Ltd., (“the 
Partnership”) was formed to acquire, develop, and manage a rent-subsidized 
apartment complex (“the Property”).  On February 26, 1979, a “Restated 
Agreement” was executed, which, among other things, stated the following: (1) Roy 
Gilleland and Cleve Smith (“Defendants”) would serve as administrative general 
partners for the first three years the Property was available for occupancy; (2) 
Defendants were entitled to 20% of the net proceeds from any sale of the Property; 
(3) Glen Claiborne would serve as managing general partner; (4) Claiborne would 
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also be entitled to 20% of the net proceeds from any sale of the Property; and (5) 
Claiborne could not transfer or sell “all or any part” of his interest without written 
consent of the Partnership.  These five provisions were re-stated by a “Companion 
Agreement” executed the same day. 
 In 1982, the Partnership executed a “Supplemental and Amended 
Agreement” that expressly stated that defendants would resign as administrative 
general partners.  In 1992, Claiborne and his wife created the G & P Claiborne Trust 
(“the Claiborne Trust”), to which Claiborne transferred his interest in the 
Partnership – a violation of the “Restated Agreement.”  Claiborne continued to serve 
as managing general partner until his death in 1997, upon which Stanley Roy – the 
trustee for the Claiborne Trust – began undertaking certain duties within the 
Partnership, including the negotiation and sale of the Property in 2000.  Following 
the sale of the Property, the limited partners – the plaintiffs – filed suit against 
Defendants and the Claiborne Trust to prevent the Defendants from obtaining 20% 
of the net proceeds as agreed under the “Restated Agreement.” 
 The plaintiffs’ argument for declaratory judgment was two-fold: (1) 
Defendants were not entitled to any of the net proceeds from the sale of the 
Property because they resigned from the Partnership in the 1982 “Supplemental and 
Amended Agreement” and (2) even if they are, the Partnership was essentially 
dissolved in 1992 when Claiborne violated the “Restated Agreement” by transferring 
his interest into the Claiborne Trust, thus creating a tenancy in common between the 
Claiborne Trust and the plaintiffs.  The trial court, noting that no facts surrounding 
the initial and subsequent agreements were disputed, found that the defendants were 
entitled to 20% of the net proceeds of the sale of the Property and that the 
Partnership was not dissolved in 1992 by Claiborne’s interest transfer.  However, the 
trial court did hold that the Partnership was dissolved in 1997 due to the partners’ 
failure to appoint another managing general partner upon Claiborne’s death, despite 
the participation of Claiborne’s trustee in the negotiation and sale of the Property. 
 The Court of Appeals examined three issues.  The first issue was whether the 
1982 “Supplemental and Amended Agreement” expressly stated that Defendants 
resigned from the Partnership as a whole, thus forfeiting their 20% interest in the net 
proceeds of the sale under the previous “Restated Agreement.”  The court, noting 
that a plain and unambiguous contract must be interpreted according to its plain 
terms, concluded that the 1982 “Supplemental and Amended Agreement” never 
expressly purported to amend or supplement the prior “Restated Agreement” 
providing Defendants with the 20% interest.  Furthermore, the 1982 agreement 
expressly stated that Defendants resigned as administrative general partners, not as 
partners all together.  Therefore, despite their near lack of involvement in the 
Partnership from 1982 to its eventual dissolution in 2000, Defendants were still 
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partners and thus, privy to all their contractual rights under the “Restated 
Agreement.” 
 The second issue the court considered was whether Claiborne’s transfer of 
his interest in the Partnership to the Trust dissolved the Partnership, resulting in a 
tenancy in common and a forfeiture of Claiborne’s 20% interest in the net proceeds 
of a sale under the “Restated Agreement.”  The court noted that under Tennessee 
Code Annotated Section 61-2-702(a) (2002), a partner may assign an interest in the 
Partnership without dissolving the Partnership, unless the partnership agreement 
states otherwise.  Clearly, Claiborne’s transfer violated the express language of the 
“Restated Agreement,” which prevented the transfer of “all or any part” of his 
interest.  Nevertheless, the court concluded that the “Restated Agreement” failed to 
state whether a violation of the agreement resulted in the Partnership’s automatic 
dissolution.  Furthermore, the court noted that following the transfer to the 
Claiborne Trust, the partners continued to treat Claiborne and, upon his death, his 
trustee, as members of the partnership.  Because this dissolution consequence was 
not expressly stated and the partners’ conduct counters dissolution, the court held 
that the Partnership did not dissolve in 1992. 
 Finally, the court considered the third issue of whether the death of 
Claiborne in 1997 and the partners’ failure to appoint another managing general 
partner resulted in dissolution of the Partnership and a forfeiture of Claiborne’s 20% 
interest under the “Restated Agreement.”  The court noted that the “Restated 
Agreement” specifically provided that upon the death of the managing general 
partner, the partnership should either appoint another managing partner or wind up.  
The Agreement, however, expressly stated that the partners would continue to share 
in the profits and losses during the liquidation in the same proportions as before the 
dissolution.  Therefore, the Claiborne Trust, upon Claiborne’s death, had a 
contractual right to the 20% interest of the net sale proceeds under the “Restated 
Agreement.” 
 Barton v. Gilleland illustrates the need for transactional attorneys to attempt to 
account for every detail in executing an initial, amended, or supplemental limited 
partnership agreement, whether or not the partners orally agree to a general 
understanding or interpretation.  Intent and interpretation, if not expressly stated in 
an agreement, are subject to the court’s interpretation.  The court, as demonstrated 
in Barton, is then reduced to an “after the fact” interpretation of the so-called plain 
meaning of words on a page, and transactional attorneys must take great care in 
choosing their words.  Transactional attorneys should also note the court’s 
unwillingness to dissolve the partnership, even in light of a blatant violation of the 
partnership agreement – an unwillingness motivated not only by the lack of express 
intent but also somewhat by principles of equity. 
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The Corporate Shield is Not Bulletproof: Piercing the Corporate Veil.  Boles v. 
National Development Co., 175 S.W.3d 226 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005).   
By Lori Lott 
 Boles v. National Development Co., was brought to the Tennessee Court of 
Appeals after an individual principal of a corporation was found liable for diminution 
in value damages for failing to complete a lake in a lake community development.  
The Tennessee Court of Appeals held that the corporate veil can be pierced and the 
individual principal held responsible where the corporation is an insolvent dummy 
corporation. 
 In the late 1990s, Hidden Valley Lakes Development in Hickman County, 
Tennessee, seemed to be an attractive investment. The developer, National 
Development Company (“NDC”), promised to provide a centerpiece for the 
development—Crystal Lake (“the lake”)— which would span thirty acres.  The lake 
would accommodate boating, skiing, and fishing. The lake was the primary draw for 
purchasers of the 3,876 lots.  However, because the lake was not properly 
constructed and would not hold water; it was, in essence, nothing but a thirty-acre 
hole in the ground.  
 In Boles, the plaintiffs claimed breach of contract against the developer NDC, 
as well as its parent company and its principle, Charles Engle (“Engle”), for failing to 
uphold the portion of the contract holding the developer responsible for the lake’s 
construction.  The suit sought recovery for the diminution in value of plaintiffs’ 
properties due to the incomplete lake.   
 The trial court bifurcated the trial.  The first trial determined the damages.  
The second trial asserted that Engle was the alter ego of NDC, and thus liable for 
the damages assessed. The trial court awarded compensatory damages and held 
Engle liable. An appeal followed. 
 On appeal, the main issue was whether piercing the corporate veil and 
finding Engle liable for the damages of the whole corporation was appropriate.  
Typically the corporation is distinct and separate from the shareholders, officers, and 
directors; however, piercing the corporate veil may become appropriate when the 
corporation is liable for a debt but is without funds to pay it and the lack of funds is 
due to some misconduct on the part of the corporate authorities.  Piercing the 
corporate veil may also be appropriate where there is a showing that it is a sham or 
dummy corporation or where it is necessary to accomplish justice.  All of the 
companies owned by Engle were insolvent.  To allow Engle to use the corporate 
entity as a shield to avoid satisfying the judgment would be an injustice.  The 
appellate court found that the evidence supported the conclusion that NCD was a 
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dummy corporation used to shield Engle from liability.  Therefore the corporate 
entity was disregarded and liability was imposed on Engle. 
 The question of when an individual should be held liable for corporate 
obligations is largely a factual one.  An individual can hide behind the walls of a 
corporation, but that does not mean that the individual is not responsible when 
things go sour, and the corporation is not able to pay. 
___________________ 
If It Looks Like a Debt, Paid Like a Debt, and Recorded Like a Debt, Guess 
What? Matthews v. Matthews, No. M2003-01159-COA-R3-CV, 2005 Tenn. App. 
LEXIS 204, 2005 WL 819728 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 7, 2005). 
By Scott Griswold 
Where a corporate entity acts as if it has assumed a debt, even though no 
written agreement exists, Tennessee courts may find a valid assumption through an 
implied contract.  The Court of Appeals recently addressed this issue in Matthews v. 
Matthews.  The Court of Appeals held that a note, paid regularly from the limited 
liability company’s (LLC’s) proceeds and carried on financial statements as a debt, 
can become a valid debt of the LLC, even in the absence of a written agreement.  
In Matthews, two brothers, as equal partners, purchased a local convenience 
store from their parents.  The parents accepted a promissory note, secured by the 
property, from the sons.  Subsequently, the brothers terminated the partnership and 
reorganized as a LLC.  Both the LLC and the partnership paid the promissory note’s 
monthly installment payment from the proceeds of the business and carried the debt 
on its financial records; however, no writings confirmed whether the debt, which was 
a personal obligation of the brothers, was assigned to the LLC.  
After four years, a rift arose between the brothers, and they terminated their 
business relationship.  This decision led to the Chancery Court ordering a closed 
auction to be held so the two brothers could bid against each other for the business. 
The auction created the current dispute about the LLC’s liabilities.  Appellant 
contended that the note was a personal debt shared between the brothers and not 
assumed by the LLC. 
A court may find a valid implied contract exists, if the circumstances and 
conduct of the parties indicate there was mutual assent or intent.  In Matthews, the 
LLC, a separate legal entity, carried the debt on its financial records as a liability and 
paid the monthly payments from the business’s proceeds.  The Chancery Court held 
that the LLC assented to assuming the note. 
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When two individuals with a preexisting personal relationship decide to go 
into business together, a legal and a business plan is desirable.  A simple business 
plan would have delineated what assets and liabilities were to transfer to the business 
and which were to remain personal.  By deciding key business decisions at the outset, 
the brothers could have avoided the expense and delay of litigation.  Matthews 
illustrates the euphuism: “an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure.”  While 
hindsight may be 20/20, practicing attorneys should counsel clients who are entering 
into business transactions that well-thought-out written agreements are worth the 
time, money, and effort. 
 
 
CONTRACTS 
When Deletion Creates Confusion: Ambiguity Warrants the Use of Parol 
Evidence.  Citadel Investments, Inc. v. White Fox Inc., f/k/a The Jones Group, No. M2003-
00741-COA-R3-CV, 2005 Tenn. App. LEXIS 292, 2005 WL 1183084 (Tenn. Ct. 
App. May 17, 2005). 
By Caitlin Shockey 
 The parol evidence rule requires courts to ascertain the meaning and 
intention of the parties by looking to the signed contract.  This rule prevents a party 
from introducing extrinsic evidence of prior or contemporaneous negotiations or 
agreements that occurred between the parties that were not included in the final, 
integrated writing representing their agreement.  However, when a contractual 
provision is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation and the terms of 
the contract are ambiguous, then extrinsic evidence may be used.   
 In Citadel Investments, Inc. v. White Fox, Inc., appellants Fox and White 
purchased a controlling interest in the Jones Group.  The dispute is whether Fox and 
White, when agreeing to purchase the corporation, also agreed to be personally liable 
for a promissory note to Citadel Investments entered into by the Jones Group.  
 The trial court found that there was no ambiguity in the agreement and 
barred parol evidence.  On appeal, Fox and White insisted the agreement was 
ambiguous.  Fox testified that a provision that would have made him and White 
personally liable was deleted from the Jones Group purchase agreement.  He 
explained that the deletion was the result of negotiations he and White had with 
Jones, the principle shareholder, wherein they unequivocally informed Jones that 
neither Fox nor White would assume personal liability for Jones’ personal 
guarantees.  White also testified that Fox and White repeatedly stated to Jones that 
they would not undertake any personal liability.   
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 The Court of Appeals reviewed two issues: (1) whether the trial court erred 
in ruling that the agreement was ambiguous and (2) whether Fox and White were 
deprived of a substantial right to introduce evidence, the exclusion of which more 
probably than not affected the outcome of the trial or resulted in prejudice to them.   
 As to the first issue, when an agreement has been reduced to a final, 
integrated writing, its true interpretation and purpose must be determined from the 
terms of the instrument itself.  When a party contends an agreement is ambiguous, 
the court’s initial task is to determine whether the language of the contract is 
ambiguous.  Here, the appellate court found the provision in question unclear since 
the paragraph did not expressly identify who would repay the note.  The phrase 
merely provided that the note would be repaid.  The appellate court also found the 
agreement silent as to the identity of any party, other than the corporation, that is 
obligated to pay the principal balance.   
Another phrase in controversy was the paragraph providing, “Buyers will 
restructure the debt of [the corporation] . . . .”  The appellate court stated that 
although it could imply that Fox and White would personally repay the note, the 
provision could also be interpreted to require the Buyers, as officers and directors, to 
cause the corporation to repay it.  Therefore, the agreement was susceptible to more 
than one reasonable interpretation.  As such, the parol evidence could be used to 
determine the intention of the parties.   
 
Citadel Investments illustrates that an ambiguous contract may warrant the use 
of parol evidence in an attempt to determine the intent of the parties.  To avoid the 
use of parol evidence, transactional attorneys should ensure that all contract terms 
are unambiguous and that the final writing completely defines the transaction.  If 
provisions to a contract are deleted, as was the case in Citadel Investments, it may be 
prudent for the transactional attorney to note this modification in the final 
agreement, perhaps in the recitals at the beginning of the agreement. 
   
___________________ 
Unacceptable: The Recipient of Nonconforming Goods May Reject Them 
without Incurring a Payment Obligation or Allowing a Draw on a Letter of 
Credit. Wings Manufacturing Corp. v. Lawson, No. M2004-00265-COA-R3-CV, 2005 
Tenn. App. LEXIS 485, 2005 WL 1950115 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 12, 2005). 
By Lauren Medley 
When a buyer justifiably rejects goods, the goods have not been “accepted,” 
and the buyer has no obligation to pay for them.  Under the Uniform Commecial 
Code (“UCC”) and the Tennessee Code Annotated (“TCA”), this protection extends 
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to instances where a letter of credit to a seller insures against the buyer’s 
nonpayment.     
In Wings Mfg. Corp. v. Lawson, the seller made an agreement with the buyer for 
an order of pre-sold apparel.  The goods did not meet the specifications in the 
contract, and the buyer notified the seller about the non-conformity and requested 
authorization to return the merchandise.  Because the seller only authorized the 
return of one shipment, Lawson sold the remaining merchandise on the secondary 
market for a fraction of the price originally expected.   
The buyer secured its obligation for payment with a domestic letter of credit, 
and the seller drew down the entire amount for the shipped merchandise, and then 
filed suit for the remaining balance.  The buyer filed a counter-complaint for breach 
of contract claiming that the seller wrongfully drew down the letter of credit.  The 
Tennessee Court of Appeals upheld the trial court’s decision that the seller breached 
the contract entitling the buyer to damages for lost profits.    
Under the UCC, the remedies available to a buyer depend in part on whether 
the buyer accepted or rejected the goods.  Further, the mere receipt of goods does 
not qualify as an acceptance.  Additionally, TCA Section 47-2-606 specifies that the 
acceptance of goods occurs when, after the buyer has a reasonable opportunity to 
inspect the goods, he signifies to the seller that they are conforming or that he will 
retain them in spite of non-conformity; he fails to make an effective rejection; or he 
does not act inconsistently with the seller’s ownership.  A seller is not generally 
entitled to recover the price of goods that are not accepted or that are rightfully 
rejected.   
The Court of Appeals upheld the trial court’s decision, holding that the buyer 
did not accept the goods in question.  The goods were effectively rejected.  
Therefore, the buyer was not obligated to pay for them.  To determine damages, the 
court looked at TCA Section 47-2-711 which states that a buyer who rightfully 
rejects goods may cancel the contract and recover damages, including incidental and 
consequential damages.  In calculating damages, the court held that the parties must 
first determine lost profits by establishing the amount the buyer would have received 
if both parties fully performed according to the terms of the agreement.  Second, the 
lost profits must be reduced by the amount the buyer received from selling the 
merchandise on the secondary markets.  Third, parties must add any incidental and 
consequential damages.  Lastly, the amount of the letter of credit that the seller 
wrongfully withdrew provides the final number for the calculation of damages owed 
to the buyer.   
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The letter of credit only serves as insurance to the seller in the case of non-
payment by a buyer, but the buyer’s obligation to pay is dependant on the seller’s 
compliance with the contract. In this case, the seller’s shipped goods did not comply. 
As Wings illustrates, the acceptance or rejection of non-conforming goods 
determines whether a buyer is obligated to pay for those goods.  When the seller 
breaches the contract, and the buyer is forced to sell the goods to mitigate losses, the 
seller is only entitled to a credit in the calculation of damages for proceeds from the 
sale.  Transactional attorneys should advise seller clients that a draw on the letter of 
credit is barred, even to cover costs incurred, when the goods have been justifiably 
rejected.  Buyer clients should be instructed to inspect goods and to notify the seller 
of any non-conformity and to reject the goods to prevent an “acceptance” and the 
following obligation to pay for the goods.   
 
 
INSURANCE 
Tennessee Tenants are Co-Insureds of their Landlords’ Insurance Policy in 
the Absence of a Contrary Agreement.  Allstate Ins. Co. v. Watson, No. M2003-
01574-COA-R3, 2005 Tenn. App. LEXIS 126, 2005 WL 457846 (Tenn. Ct. App. 
Feb. 25, 2005) appeal granted No. M2003-01574-SC-R11-CV, 2005 Tenn. Lexis 669 
(Tenn. Aug. 22, 2005).  
By Josh Ganz 
When a lease between a landlord and a tenant is silent as to who is 
responsible for securing fire insurance on the rental property, a question arises as to 
whether the tenant is a co-insured under the landlord’s insurance policy.  This 
question was recently decided by the Tennessee Court of Appeals in Allstate Insurance 
Co. v. Watson.  The Court held that unless the lease explicitly states otherwise, a 
tenant is impliedly co-insured by the landlord’s fire insurance policy.  Thus, the 
landlord’s insurer is barred from initiating a suit in subrogation against a negligent 
tenant. 
 In Allstate Insurance, pursuant to the landlord’s fire insurance policy, the 
insurer, Allstate Insurance Company (“Allstate”), paid the landlord of rental property 
for losses sustained during a fire.  At the time of the fire, Robert Watson (“Watson”) 
was a tenant of the property.  Watson’s lease provided, “Residents are responsible 
for all damages to the apartment, intentional or non intentional.”  However, the lease 
was silent as to whether the landlord or the tenant was responsible for procuring 
property insurance.  Relying on the provision in the lease, Allstate brought a 
subrogation action against Watson.  The trial court found that Watson was not 
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negligent in causing the fire, but he was liable to Allstate under supposed subrogation 
provisions in the lease.   
 Generally, there is a split of authority among jurisdictions on this issue.  The 
minority view is that the tenant may be held liable in the event of a fire, and the 
landlord’s insurer may pursue the claim against the tenant.  The majority view holds 
that, in the absence of an agreement to the contrary, a tenant is a presumptive 
insured of his or her landlord’s insurance policy — even when the tenant is not 
specifically named.  The Tennessee Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s 
decision, relying on the majority viewpoint, otherwise known as the “reasonable 
expectations rationale.”  Implicit in this rationale is that the tenant’s reasonable 
expectations are for the landlord to insure the property and pass the cost of 
insurance payments on to the tenant in the form of higher rent.  Thus, the 
reasonable expectations doctrine presumes that the tenant is a co-insured.  As such, 
the tenant is shielded from liability to the insurer because an insurer cannot seek 
subrogation from its own insured.   
 Subject to pending review by the Tennessee Supreme Court, the reasonable 
expectations rationale/co-insured doctrine will eliminate uncertainty and provide 
uniformity in the landlord-tenant relationship.  If an insurer of a Tennessee landlord 
does not intend to cover the tenant of the rental property in its fire insurance policy, 
the landlord must include a provision in the lease which makes the tenant 
responsible for procuring fire insurance.  Alternatively, and certainly easier 
administratively, insurance companies can raise landlords’ fire insurance premiums to 
also cover tenants of the rental property.  Regardless of which approach insurance 
companies take, Tennessee tenants will be affected—they will either pay for the 
insurance in the form of their own insurance policies or in the form of higher rent.  
___________________ 
Insurance Exclusions Strictly Construed as to Childcare Arrangements.  Mid-
Century Ins. Co. v. Williams, 174 S.W.3d 230 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005) appeal denied 2005 
Tenn. LEXIS 791 (Tenn. Sept. 6, 2005). 
By Leigh Griggs 
Where a childcare arrangement constitutes a “business pursuit” and “home 
care service” within the exclusions in a homeowner’s insurance policy, coverage of 
the wrongful death of a minor child in the insured’s home and under the insured’s 
care is barred.  Such was the situation presented to the Tennessee Court of Appeals 
in Mid-Century Ins. Co. v. Williams.   
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 In Mid-Century Ins. Co. v. Williams, the Defendant served as caregiver for her 
four grandchildren while her daughter, their mother, was at work.  The Defendant 
received payment for these services from Southwest Resources, a Department of 
Human Services Facility.  In addition to her four grandchildren, the Defendant 
agreed to watch the two children of Ms. Futrell, a family friend.  Ms. Futrell’s two 
children, Quisha and Petey, were ages four and one respectively.  One morning the 
Defendant left Petey alone while the two older children were bathing, and Petey 
accidentally fell into the bathtub and drowned.  Ms. Futrell filed a wrongful death 
lawsuit against the Defendant.  The Defendant had a Special Form Homeowner’s 
Package Policy issued to them by the Plaintiffs, but when the accident was reported, 
the Plaintiffs denied coverage based on the following exclusion: “We do not cover 
bodily injury . . . which arises from or during the course of business pursuits of an 
insured . . . or (4) results from the legal liability of any insured because of home care 
services provided to any person on a regular basis . . . Regular basis means more than 
20 hours per week.”       
 At trial, the Defendant testified as to her childcare services.  The trial court 
found that the arrangement was informal and that the Defendant was not motivated 
by profit.  Therefore, the exclusion of the homeowner’s policy was not applicable.   
 The appellate court disagreed with the trial court’s fact-finding, and held that 
both the business pursuit exclusion and the home care service exclusion barred 
coverage by the homeowner’s insurance policy.  Analyzing the record, the court 
believed that the AFDC payments of $300 a month that the Defendant received for 
caring for her grandchildren, together with her expectation of compensation by Ms. 
Futrell for keeping Petey and Quisha, revealed that the Defendant’s motive was for 
profit.     
 After concluding that the childcare arrangement between the Defendant and 
Ms. Futrell was motivated by profit and that it was a continued or regular activity, 
the court interpreted the contract to determine whether it applied to the facts of this 
case.  The court concluded that the language of the contract was not ambiguous and 
so it had to determine whether the arrangement constituted a business pursuit or 
home care service as provided in the exclusions relied upon by the Plaintiffs.  Guided 
by the majority rule that “a pursuit is a business only if (1) there is a motive for profit 
AND (2) it is continued or regular activity” the court held that the childcare 
arrangement at issue in this case was a business pursuit and the arrangement 
constituted a home service within the meaning of the homeowner’s policy; therefore, 
the trial court erred in concluding that the business pursuit exclusion in the 
homeowners policy did not bar coverage in this case. 
 As the Williams case illustrates, where an insurance policy unambiguously 
states exclusions concerning business pursuits and home care services, a childcare 
2006] CASE COMMENTARIES  431 
 
 
arrangement motivated by profit and conducted on a regular basis will fall within 
these exclusions.  Insureds are well advised to take the language of the exclusions 
literally; insurers are, in turn, advised to provide unambiguous descriptions of the 
exclusions from coverage. 
___________________ 
Debtors Must Be Provided with Written Notice of Insurance Denials.  Rice v. 
Andrew Johnson Bank, No. E2004-01469-COA-R3-CV, 2005 Tenn. App. LEXIS 177, 
2005 WL 711973 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 29, 2005). 
By Meredith Adams Mallard 
 Tennessee Code Annotated Section 56-7-909(a) (2000) (“Section 56-7-909”) 
requires an insurance company to provide written notice of insurance denials.  Thus, 
in Tennessee, if a debtor has applied and paid a premium to a bank for a credit life 
insurance policy and the insurance company denies the application, the debtor must 
be provided with written notice of the denial before a valid claim against the insurer 
arises.  Insurers should be active participants in this notification process and should 
not rely on banks to inform debtors of such denials. 
 The debtor submitted an application with the bank for credit life insurance to 
insure the principal amount of his loan.  The application stated that it was “‘subject 
to approval’” but that insurance would be provided if a valid claim arose before the 
insurer took action on the application.  The debtor paid the insurance premium, 
which was to be returned to the debtor if the insurance was denied.  The bank then 
submitted the application, along with a portion of the premium, to the insurer. 
 The insurer denied the debtor’s application by sending the bank a letter and 
returning its portion of the premium.  The bank then credited the refunded premium 
to the debtor’s loan.  In the insurer’s letter to the bank, the insurer requested that the 
bank notify the debtor of the denial and forward a copy of the letter to him.  
However, neither the bank nor the insurer sent written notice to the debtor 
informing him of the denial.     
 The debtor died without being notified that his insurance application had 
been denied.  A representative of his estate requested that the insurer pay the bank 
the proceeds of the policy and that the bank declare the loan satisfied.  The insurer 
and bank both refused to comply, asserting that the debtor was never covered under 
the insurance.  The debtor’s representative then sued, claiming that the insurance 
contract was valid because the debtor was never informed of the denial.   
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The Court of Appeals of Tennessee held that summary judgment by the trial 
court was inappropriate because a material issue of fact existed as to whether the 
debtor was provided with written notice of the coverage denial before his claim 
arose.  Under Section 56-7-909, a debtor who has paid a bank a premium for credit 
life insurance must immediately be provided with written notice if the insurer denies 
the application.  Additionally, the insurance company’s policy contained language to 
the same effect.   
During discovery, the insurer never affirmatively stated that they provided 
the debtor with the requisite written notice.  Therefore, they had not demonstrated 
that they had taken action and provided the debtor with notice of the insurance 
denial before his claim arose.  Because the insurer had not affirmatively negated an 
essential element of the claim, the court should have denied summary judgment for 
the defendants. 
 The decision emphasizes that insurance companies cannot take shortcuts and 
depend on banks to notify debtors that their insurance applications have been 
denied.  If they do so, they run the risk that the bank will not provide the debtor 
with written notice and that the debtor will have a valid insurance claim that the 
insurer must satisfy.  Instead, insurers should play it safe and themselves provide 
debtors with written notice of insurance application denials. 
___________________ 
Insurance Companies Must Honor the Plain Meaning of Their Policies and 
Cover Contractors for Faulty Workmanship under the Subcontractor 
Exception.  Travelers Indemnity Co. of America, v. Moore & Assoc., No. M2004-01233-
COA-R3-CV, 2005 Tenn. App. LEXIS 596, 2005 WL 2293009 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 
20, 2005). 
By John Eskew 
 The Tennessee Court of Appeals held that while the standard commercial 
general liability insurance policy does not provide coverage to an insured contractor 
for the breach of contract grounded upon its own faulty workmanship, the exception 
for the damaged work or damage arising from the work performed by a 
subcontractor is indeed covered by the commercial general liability insurance and the 
insurance company must honor its deal with the insured.   
 The plaintiffs, Travelers Indemnity Company of America (“Travelers”) 
issued Commercial General Liability (“CGL”) insurance policies to the defendant, 
Moore & Associates (“Moore”).  Moore entered into a construction contract with 
Hilcom Partners (“Hilcom”) to design and build a Hilton Garden Inn hotel in Texas.  
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As most general contractors do, Moore used several subcontractors in the 
construction.  The construction ended in 2002.  In 2003, Hilcom filed a Demand for 
Arbitration alleging Moore negligently designed and installed the windows, allowing 
water and moisture to enter causing early deterioration and damage to the structure, 
walls, and fixtures.   
 Moore sought to use the GCL insurance policy, which reserved in Travelers 
a duty to defend Moore in the event of a demand for damages based upon property 
damaged by an “occurrence,” to pay for the defense of the arbitration.  Travelers 
brought this action asserting that it had no duty to defend Moore.  Travelers argued 
the damage did not amount to “property damage caused by an occurrence other than 
to ‘your work’ according to the terms of the CGL.”  The chancery court granted 
Moore summary judgment, and Travelers appealed. 
 The Tennessee Appellate Court held that an insurer has a duty to defend 
when its policy arguably covers the claims raised against the insured.  The policy 
does not provide coverage to an insured contractor for faulty work or materials 
where the damages claimed are the cost of correcting the work itself.   However, the 
insurance industry itself included a subcontractors exception in its policies after 
1986.  This exception provides that if a subcontractor performs work leading to 
damage, the “your work” exclusion does not apply, and the CGL does cover it.  The 
Court stated that such specific language drafted by the insurance company itself 
cannot be ignored when interpreting the case law. Therefore, whether the 
subcontractors and contractors work constitutes “property damage” or an 
“occurrence” triggering the exclusion exception must be determined.  Damages to 
Hilcom were not limited to the defective work itself, but also the damage that 
resulted from the water and moisture seeping in and damaging the walls, structure 
and furnishings; therefore, “property damage” did occur.  Since the damage resulted 
from the subcontractor’s poor workmanship, the exception to the exclusion applies, 
and Travelers had a duty to defend Moore. 
 The Court seemingly predictably upheld the insurance policy by relying on a 
plain interpretation of the contract.  Following the reasoning of other jurisdictions, 
the Court of Appeals held that the language implemented by the insurance company 
itself cannot be ignored.  Transactional attorneys should be mindful of the court’s 
willingness to follow a strict interpretation of the contract and draft carefully. 
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LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT 
Most Covenants Not to Compete against Physicians are No Longer 
Enforceable in Tennessee.  Murfreesboro Med. Clinic v. Udom, 166 S.W.3d 674 (Tenn. 
2005). 
By Aaron Belville 
According to Murfreesboro Med. Clinic, a physician’s covenant not to compete 
is unenforceable unless specifically authorized by statute.  In reaching this decision, 
the Tennessee Supreme Court determined that the nature of the medical profession 
creates special policy considerations that should prevent enforcement of physician 
non-compete provisions. 
Murfreesboro Medical Clinic (“MMC”) is a private medical clinic located in 
Murfreesboro, Tennessee.  In the early part of 2000, Dr. David Udom entered into 
an employment contract with MMC which provided that Udom would practice 
medicine at MMC for two years.  The contract also contained a provision that, once 
his employment was terminated, Udom would not practice medicine within 25 miles 
of Murfreesboro for a period of 18 months.  A little over a month after his contract 
expired with MMC, Dr. Udom informed MMC that he intended to open a solo 
practice in Smyrna, Tennessee, located approximately 15 miles from Murfreesboro.  
MMC then attempted to enforce the non-compete provision against Dr. Udom. 
The Court began its analysis by stating that Tennessee law views covenants 
not to compete as restraints on trade that are generally disfavored.  However, when 
legitimate business interests are implicated, Tennessee courts will still enforce 
reasonable covenants not to compete.  To determine whether a non-compete clause 
is reasonable, courts consider time and territorial limitations, economic effects on 
both the employer and the employee, and the impact on the public interest.  
Covenants that involve important public policy concerns, such as those involving 
physicians, are typically construed more strictly. 
The Supreme Court, citing the American Medical Association (“AMA”) 
Code of Medical Ethics, which strongly discourages physicians’ covenants not to 
compete, iterated several concerns associated with physician non-compete clauses 
that are not present in the usual employment context.  These concerns include 
encouraging greater access to affordable, quality health care and promoting a 
patient’s right to choose a physician and to maintain an ongoing relationship with 
that physician.  Despite the dissent’s preference to strike down the specific non-
compete provision in Murfreesboro Med. Clinic as overbroad, the majority viewed 
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physician non-compete agreements as negatively impacting the public’s access to 
health care - something that should not be tolerated.  While the Court noted that 
many states continue to view physician non-compete agreements no differently than 
other covenants not to compete, it did recognize a growing trend to treat them 
differently.  In reaching its decision, the Court drew multiple comparisons between 
physician non-compete agreements and attorney non-compete agreements, which 
have been prohibited in Tennessee since the early 1990s. 
In deciding that physician non-compete agreements are generally 
unenforceable, the Supreme Court noted certain situations where the Tennessee 
legislature has recognized an acceptable circumstance for a physician non-compete 
clause to be enforced.  Tennessee Code Annotated Section 63-6-204 (2005) provides 
that, when the employer attempting to impose the non-compete agreement is a 
hospital, an affiliate of a hospital, or a faculty practice plan associated with a medical 
school, non-compete clauses may be enforceable. 
Murfreesboro Med. Clinic is a good example of the growing trend across the 
nation to treat physician non-compete clauses differently than other employment 
contracts.  This decision highlights some of the policy considerations that a court 
may use in determining whether to enforce a covenant not to compete. 
 
___________________ 
Geographic Coverage of Employee Non-Compete Agreement Must Be 
Reasonable to Be Enforceable.  Outfitters Satellite, Inc. v. CIMA, No. M2003-02074-
COA-R3-CV, 2005 Tenn. App. LEXIS 86, 2005 WL 309370 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 8, 
2005).  
By Jennifer G. Rowlett 
 Where geographic terms of a non-compete agreement are overly broad, the 
geographic area may be narrowed.  Outfitters Satellite, Inc. v. CIMA illustrates a court’s 
ability to revise contractual terms within the context of enforcing a non-compete 
agreement.  Smith, a former employee of Outfitters Satellite (“Outfitters”), entered 
into a non-compete agreement with Outfitters after he had been employed by the 
company for several months and proven himself to be a successful salesperson.  At 
that time, Smith had established relationships with Outfitters’ customers.  Thus, 
Outfitters structured an agreement that would prevent competition in the event 
Smith left the company.  The non-compete agreement provided that, following his 
departure from Outfitters, Smith would not engage with any of its business 
competitors or interfere with the company’s business relationships for a period of 
three years.  The non-compete agreement contained no geographical limitations 
because of the worldwide potential for sales via the internet.   
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 Smith did in fact leave the company.  Additionally, he allegedly interfered 
with Outfitters’ client relationships and entered negotiations for a contract with 
Outfitters’ software developer.  Outfitters filed suit seeking to enforce the non-
compete agreement against Smith.  The trial court found that Smith was in breach of 
the agreement because of his relationships with Outfitters’ clients and dealers.  
Accordingly, the court enjoined Smith from competing with Outfitters for one year 
in North America.   
 On appeal, Smith averred that the non-compete was unenforceable, or, 
alternatively, that the geographical limitations of the non-compete were over-
inclusive.  The Tennessee Supreme Court recognizes the enforceability of non-
compete agreements if they satisfy the standard of “reasonable under the particular 
circumstances.”  The court determined that at the time the non-compete agreement 
was made Outfitters had an interest in protecting itself from potential competition 
from Smith because he was a successful salesperson who had established 
relationships with the company’s clients.  Smith’s employment and remuneration by 
Outfitters constituted consideration for the agreement.  Further, the court noted 
Outfitters’ vulnerability because of the losses it suffered following Smith’s departure 
from the company, as well as the public policy argument of protecting businesses 
from unfair competition.  Hence, the court determined that the non-compete 
agreement was enforceable.  
 The second issue before the court was whether the geographical limitation of 
the non-compete agreement was too broad.  When determining if a non-compete 
agreement is reasonable, it is necessary to consider the elements of time and 
geography.  The limitations on geography must not go beyond what is needed to 
protect the employer’s legitimate interests.  Testimony by Outfitters’ president 
indicated that the company sought enforcement of the non-compete only within the 
United States, since that is its primary business location.  Therefore, the appellate 
court limited the injunction to just the United States, rather than North America.  
The adjustment by the court produced reasonable limits on the scope of the non-
compete agreement.  
As Outfitters Satellite, Inc. illustrates, under Tennessee law, the terms of a non-
compete agreement in an employment contract must be reasonable to be 
enforceable.  If a court determines that the geographical terms are overly broad, the 
court may modify the terms to satisfy the reasonableness standard.  Drafters of non-
compete agreements should limit geographical restrictions to only those places vital 
to the employer’s interests. 
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PROPERTY 
Tennessee Court of Appeals Enforces Installment Land Contracts.  Kafozi v. 
Windward Cove, LLC, No. E2004-01791-COA-R3-CV, 2005 Tenn. App. LEXIS 541, 
2005 WL 2051292 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 26, 2005). 
By John Inman 
 The issue in this case is whether an installment sales contract (the 
“Contract”) provided a due date for payment by the Plaintiffs of the balance of the 
purchase price of a subdivision lot, and whether the Plaintiffs breached the contract 
by not paying the balance.  The Court of Appeals held that the Contract did provide 
a set due date and that the Plaintiffs breached the Contract by not paying the full 
amount by that date.  
 Plaintiffs Rabia and Audrey Kafozi signed an installment sales contract to 
purchase real property from Defendant Windward Cove, LLC for $100,000.  The 
Contract provided that the Plaintiffs would pay $25,000 at signing and $2,000 each 
month for 12 months “until February 10, 2001, when the balance of the purchase 
price shall become due and payable. . . .”  The Contract gave Plaintiffs the option to 
extend the due date for six months.  The Contract also provided that “[F]or every 
month beyond the eighteen (18) months above-stated, [Plaintiffs] will pay a penalty 
of five percent (5%) figured on an annual basis of the unpaid balance till paid.”  
After twelve months, Plaintiffs took the six month extension option, and at 
the end of this six month period, Defendant gave Plaintiffs another six month 
extension.  At the end of the second six month period, on February 10, 2002, 
Defendant sent Plaintiffs a notice of default and a demand for payment of the 
balance of the purchase price ($46,455.85).  This letter restated language from the 
Contract giving Defendant ten days to cure from the date of default.  Plaintiffs 
received the letter, but did not pay the balance within ten days.  On February 27, 
2002, Defendant sold the lot to a third party.  The trial court held that the Contract 
did not provide a due date for payment by the Plaintiffs of the balance of the 
purchase price and awarded the Plaintiffs $54,500 plus 10% interest per annum from 
February 27, 2002, the date Defendant sold the property to a third party.   
The Court of Appeals looked to the language of the Contract and found, 
after considering the two extensions, it clearly and unambiguously set a due date of 
February 10, 2002.  The Court also discussed the penalty clause and found that it did 
not create ambiguity in the due date, but simply provided the Defendant with an 
additional remedy if Plaintiffs did not pay by the extended due date.  The Court went 
on to suggest that if Plaintiffs could have shown that they were approved for a loan 
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during the ten day cure period, the Court would have considered this as evidence 
favorable to Plaintiffs, however, Plaintiffs never raised this argument.  
 This decision results in a harsh outcome for the Plaintiffs, who paid roughly 
half of the purchase price for this lot and came away with nothing to show for it.  
The result shows that an installment land contract is a risky and ill-advised way to 
finance a real estate purchase.  Practitioners should be mindful of this and realize 
that installment land contracts will be upheld. 
 
___________________ 
Action for Professional Negligence of Auctioneer Enforceable Despite Signed 
Contract.  Land v. Dixon, No. E2004-03019-COA-R3-CV, 2005 Tenn. App. LEXIS 
401, 2005 WL 1618743 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 12, 2005). 
By Kristine West 
 The Tennessee Court of Appeals discussed two issues in Land v. Dixon.  
First, the court held that a cause of action for misrepresentation does not exist when 
parties have prior knowledge of the misrepresentation and voluntarily proceed with 
the contract.  Second, the court held that a cause of action for professional 
negligence of an auctioneer or real estate broker exists when the applicable standard 
of care is violated by the circumstances.  This professional negligence action is not 
barred by the doctrine of merger.  In addition, the plaintiff’s choice to execute the 
contract resulting from the auction does not bar the claim. 
 The defendants conducted an auction of property.  Prior to the auction, the 
defendants represented the auction as a sale by order of trustee in a published 
brochure.  The defendants did not disclose their interest in the property and made 
other misrepresentations.   
 Before the auction began, the defendants announced that the auction would 
be conducted according to the “two-minute rule.”  The “two-minute rule” provides 
that once the auctioneer determines that too much time has passed between bids, the 
auctioneer will announce the start of a two minute period.  Once the two minute 
period is called, if no new bid is submitted within two minutes, then the last person 
submitting a bid prior to the start of the two minute period becomes the purchaser 
of the property.  Despite circumstances that should end the auction according to the 
“two-minute rule,” the defendants continued with the auction.  As a result, the 
plaintiffs paid a greater amount for the property than they would have paid if the 
two-minute rule had been enforced.   
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 Plaintiffs filed a complaint concerning the misrepresentations made by the 
defendants and the professional negligence that occurred during the auction.  
However within an hour of this filing, the plaintiffs voluntarily closed on the 
contract with full knowledge of all the alleged misrepresentations made by 
defendants.  The trial court dismissed both complaints for failure to state a claim 
upon which relief may be granted. 
 The court held that a claim based on misrepresentation is not actionable if 
the plaintiffs voluntarily close on the contract with full knowledge of alleged 
misrepresentations.  Consequently, the plaintiffs are precluded from recovering 
damages based on these misrepresentations.  A person who possesses all of the facts 
and who chooses to proceed with the purchase cannot recover on the basis of fraud 
or misrepresentation. 
 However, the plaintiff’s choice to proceed with the contract does not 
preclude the plaintiff from bringing an action for professional misconduct.  “A real 
estate broker who breaches the duty to act honestly and in good faith, and with 
reasonable skill and care, is potentially liable to a party injured by such a breach.”  
The doctrine of merger does not preclude this action.  The plaintiff should be 
allowed the opportunity to prove that the defendant’s negligence or intentional 
tortious conduct damaged the plaintiff. 
 This decision highlights two basic principles that should guide attorneys.  
First, voluntarily entering into a contract with full knowledge of prior 
misrepresentations precludes one from later bringing actions for fraud or 
misrepresentation.  Second, voluntarily entering a contract resulting from an auction 
does not preclude actions for professional negligence against the auctioneer or real 
estate broker.   
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TAX 
Post-merger Continuation of a Consolidated Group after Its Common Parent 
Merged Downstream into a Subsidiary.  Falconwood Corp. v. U.S., 422 F.3d 1339 
(Fed. Cir. 2005). 
By Brian O’Shaughnessy 
As a general rule, a consolidated group’s continued existence is tied to its 
common parent.1  If the common parent remains in existence, the group continues 
for a taxable year as long as at least one subsidiary is affiliated with the common 
parent just before and after the start of that year.  26 C.F.R. § 1.1502-75(d)(1).  Thus, 
the consolidated group continues for the entire year even if the common parent 
disposes of all of its subsidiaries during the year.  In that case, the group’s return for 
the year includes the common parent’s tax items for the full year and any subsidiary’s 
items for the portion of the year during which it was a member.  26 C.F.R. § 1.1502-
76(b)(1)(i).   
If, however, the common parent merges downstream into an acquiring 
subsidiary, the consolidated group continues notwithstanding the fact the common 
parent no longer exists.  The group continues, for example, if the acquiring 
subsidiary in form becomes the common parent of the group, and “there remains” at 
least one subsidiary in the group that had been in the group affiliated with the 
common parent of that group before the merger.  See 26 C.F.R. § 1.1502-75(d)(2)(ii). 
In Falconwood Corp. v. U.S., the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals considered 
whether a consolidated group continued when the common parent merged into a 
subsidiary and, within three hours, the subsidiary sold all remaining subsidiaries to its 
shareholders.   
Even though the merger and sales were part of a single plan, the court 
determined that the consolidated group continued with the acquiring corporation as 
its common parent.  Consequently, the acquiring corporation could carry back its 
post-merger losses to offset group income from earlier years, resulting in a 
significant tax benefit.    
At issue is whether the affiliated group survived when Parent merged with 
the taxpayer, thus fulfilling requirement that following a transfer of assets to a 
                                                 
1 A consolidated group is an affiliated group of corporations that elects to file a consolidated return.  
See I.R.C.  § 1501.  The key advantage of filing a consolidated return is that one group member’s 
financial loss may be used to offset another group member’s gain. 
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subsidiary “there remains one or more chains of includible corporations connected 
through stock ownership with a common parent corporation which is an includible 
corporation and which was a member of the group prior to the date such former 
parent cease to exist.”  26 C.F.R. § 1.1502-75(d)(2)(ii).  Consistent with the substance 
over form doctrine, the Court of Federal Claims concluded that no subsidiaries 
remained affiliated with the acquiring subsidiary, largely because the disposition of 
the remaining subsidiaries was a part of the overall merger transaction.   
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit disagreed, concluding that the 
short-term ownership of the subsidiary stock satisfied the “affiliation” requirement.  
It found case law or regulations to define what period of time a subsidiary had to 
remain affiliated with the acquiring subsidiary for the group to survive.  The court 
held that a plain meaning interpretation must be applied.  If, however, a plain 
meaning interpretation applied to all cases, the step transaction doctrine never 
would.2  The court stated that in this case the plain meaning interpretation, and not 
the step transaction doctrine, should apply because the taxpayer had an independent 
business purpose for the downstream merger.  Thus, the court held there is no 
“principled difference between the three-hour time period in this case and the 
passage of days or weeks or months in some other case....”  The statute is interpreted 
as simply requiring that there remains, if even for just a moment, a chain of 
includible corporations as existed immediately before the merger of the common 
parent into the taxpayer. 
This case raises questions as to how the substance over form doctrine is 
applied to Treasury Regulations addressing consolidated groups.  As a result of the 
holding, inexperienced taxpayers may reach the otherwise logical conclusion that 
form trumps substance and performing one merger a few hours before or after 
another will impact tax treatment prescribed in the Code and corresponding 
regulations.  Although this case supports such a conclusion, it is an exception and 
not the rule. 
 
 
 
                                                 
2 “The step transaction doctrine is a judicial manifestation of the more general tax law ideal that effect 
should be given to the substance, rather than the form, of a transaction, ‘by ignoring for tax purposes, 
steps of an integrated transaction that separately are without substance.’” Falconwood, 422 F.3d at 1349 
(quoting Dietzsch v. U.S., 498 F.2d 1344, 1346 (1974)). 
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